is not the first crisis of institutional legitimacy faced by the IWC, it raises deeper questions about the sustainability of the IWC as the international body that is not only responsible for imposing a commercial whaling moratorium but that is also required to "provide for the conservation, development, and optimum utilization of the whale resources. Part Three offers brief comments on how Article VIII of the ICRW may need to be amended or risk institutional implosion.
Early Fissures in the ICRW Treaty Regime
In the 1930s and 1940s, it became clear to many States that whale populations had been severely overharvested to be processed into oil, soaps and other household products like margarine as well as being consumed as meat. 5 Yet, the genesis of the ICRW regime as a In response to the vote, Japan "explained that while it was favourable to a moratorium on commercial whaling, it had abstained in the vote because the whole question was to be considered by the International Whaling Commission on the basis of available scientific information.") 9 International Commission on Whaling, Twenty-Fourth Report of the Commission, Appendix III, "International Whaling Commission Chairman's Report of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting, Summary of Main Decisions Made at Meeting" (1974) 20-36 at pp. 24-25 (Observing that a global moratorium was opposed by frustrated with the politics of the IWC, the IWC was regarded as an institution captured by minority interests until 1982 when a 10-year moratorium was adopted for all commercial whaling until additional studies could be undertaken to determine what level of commercial whaling might be sustainably revived. The moratorium vote reflected a new pattern of rift lines. 10 The IWC that had been designed as an institution to protect the long-term interests of whaling industry through the conservation of whale populations for harvest had gradually became "preservationist." 11 After the moratorium, the protection of certain whale species and the creation of whale sanctuaries under the ICRW were both deemed necessary by the majority of IWC parties to achieve global preservation objectives rather than resource management measures. With a prohibition on all commercial whaling in the Indian Ocean any Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking and treating of whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this Convention.
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The original Article VIII language was negotiated at a time when it was not possible for
States to conduct non-lethal scientific investigation in order to understand the life histories of whales. In the 1940s and 1950s with the introduction of the ICRW, the quality of global whale data was poor. by allowing Japan to harvest a small number of whales while ending the scientific purpose exception and bringing all whaling under the IWC's regulatory authority. 34 The consensus was never adopted.
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Australia questioned the increasing post-moratorium trends in Japanese whaling. If Japan was indeed pursuing the various research ends that it articulated in JARPA II, did Japan need to employ lethal methods to collect data on whaling stocks and marine ecosystems or was JARPA II essentially the equivalent of a commercial whaling program because it was not justified "for purposes of scientific research"? Could the pursuit of science explain why under JARPA II Japan assigned itself an annual quota of 850 minke whales, 50 humpback whales and 50 fin whales when Japan's previous research efforts had only taken 840 whales in the Antarctic over the course of almost three decades? 36 Was Japan hoodwinking all of the nations that had voted for the moratorium and exacerbating the institutional problems that already existed before the moratorium was approved? Or was Japan making a good faith effort to understand how to revive a commercial whaling industry in light of changed environmental conditions? The answers to these questions were politically charged. back to institutions that it might consider functionally problematic. When the Court described its review process as including steps to determine "whether, in the use of lethal methods the programme's design and implementation are reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objective", the Court also emphasized "this standard of review is an objective one. and that the permits that were provided did not contain necessary information. While the ICJ was persuaded that Japan had complied with these procedural components, the ICJ provided two additional comments hinting at discord within the Scientific Committee. First, they observed that the procedural requirements in the Schedule and Guidelines "must be techniques. 45 In relation to the implementation of JARPA II, the ICJ expressed concern that the annual lethal sample sizes were not re-evaluated in light of the gap between the research plan's proposed target sample size and the actual take. 46 The ICJ ultimately concluded that JARPA II lacked sufficient evidence to support a nexus between its articulated research objectives and the numbers of whales that might be taken under the Japanese issued research permits.
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While the ICJ appropriately did not weigh in on matters of scientific dispute, it did assume an active role in deciding questions regarding the "reasonableness" of JARPA II under the ICRW.
Reflecting the current level of institutional dysfunction within the ICRW framework, the ICJ majority chose to assert its judicial authority as a temporary trucemaker between Japan as a pro-whaling State and Australia and New Zealand as pro-preservation States by making 43 Ibid., at para. 241, p. 69. 44 Whaling in the Antarctic, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Yusuf (n.1) at para. 4. p. 1; see also ibid., at para. 17, p. 4 and at para. 61, p. 16 ("It is a pity that… the Court has engaged in an evaluation of the design and implementation of the programme [JARPA II] and their reasonableness in relation to its objectives, a task that normally falls within the competence of the Scientific Committee of the IWC ... As a matter of fact, when the Scientific Committee took the view in the past that a permit proposal submitted by a State did not meet its criteria, it specifically recommended that the permits sought should not be issued. This has not been the case with regard to JARPA II, but it shows at least that the Committee's practice is adequate to the task of evaluating the design and implementation of scientific research programmes under the ICRW and accordingly advising the IWC on that matter.") 45 Whaling in the Antarctic, Judgment (n. 1) at para. 137, p. 43. 46 Id., at para. 156, p. 48. 47 Id., at paras. 195-198, pp. 57-58. Particularly troubling for several of the judges was the lack of assessment of JARPA before Japan issued permits under JARPA II that were "virtual replicas" of the JARPA permits.
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The judges expressed concern that the review process before the Committee which they understood as being integral to the operation of the ICRW was being treated as an "unacceptable 'rubber stamp' mechanism" in violation of a duty to co-operate that is "a broad and purposive obligation that entails an on-going dialogue with the Scientific Committee."
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The question after Whaling in the Antarctic is whether the Committee will be able to contribute meaningfully to discussions regarding the future of whales and whaling or whether the efforts of the Committee to promote scientific methodology will be hijacked by national politics.
Renegotiating Faultlines: Proposals for Annex VIII Reform
At the IWC's meeting in September 2014 after the ICJ decision, Parties adopted a resolution on whaling under special permit which included the request that States not issue further permits until (1) the Scientific Committee had an opportunity to provide advice on "reasonableness" and (2) the Commission could review an Scientific Committee report to make such recommendations "as it sees fit." 55 The resolution identified the ICJ opinion and noted that the opinion presented an authoritative interpretation of Article VIII. Specifically, the resolution recalled that the "Court established several parameters for a programme for purposes of scientific research" that the IWC should consider when reviewing special permits. 56 The IWC made note of certain elements that it might review including "the scale of the programme's use of lethal sampling, the methodology used to select sample sizes, a comparison of the target sample sizes and the actual take, the timeframe associated with a programme, the programme's scientific output, and the degree to which a programme coordinates its activities with related research projects." 57 Significantly, the vote on the resolution was not a consensus vote but ended with 35 parties in favor, 25 against, and 5
abstentions. 58 The vote on the resolution reflected the differences between whaling industry But can the Scientific Committee as an institution satisfy the competing interests of sufficient member States to be considered an effective treaty institution? In practice, the Scientific Committee reports since the inception of JARPA II have reflected repeated problems in reviewing ICRW Article VIII permit proposals. 62 In 2005, for example, during the review process of JARPA II permits, the Committee commented that "the Committee recognises the chronic difficulties it faces in separating purely scientific issues from those issues that are more appropriate for discussion in other fora and notably the Commission." 63 In 2006, the Committee noted that "it has difficulties in reviewing scientific permit proposals" because it was not possible for "a large Working Group of the Committee …to efficiently review complex documents such as the recent special permit proposals." 64 In 2007, the Committee commented again that "the process for reviewing the special permits is less than satisfactory." 65 The Committee opined that scientists who were participating in special permit review from a Government who was requesting review of a special permit should not participate in the drafting of the "findings and recommendations" which should "only reflect the opinions of the independent experts." Four of the ten members apparently had played important roles in earlier reviews of special permits for Japan. 68 Members of the Scientific Committee were split about the need for members of an expert panel to submit conflict of interest statements before reviewing proposals to issue scientific permits. 69 Adding to the challenges of creating an independent panel, the 2010 Scientific Committee report also suggested that Parties such as Japan seeking review of special permits are not providing review panels with sufficient information before the requested review.
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In 2012 and 2013, it was unclear whether any special permits that Japan intended to issue under JARPA II were ever reviewed by the Scientific Committee. In 2013, the only note in the Scientific Committee report under review of new "proposals" indicated that "Japan reported that there was no plan to change the JARPA II programme." 71 While reviews of any special permits for these seasons may appear in subsidiary documentation, it is surprising that there is no mention of permits given that the Scientific Committee is expected to review proposals for scientific permits before they are issued by a ICRW party and permits were presumably issued for the 2013-2014 whaling season.
In 2014, Japan prepared a new proposal for Antarctic whaling to be vetted under a process that included review "by a small specialist workshop with a limited but adequate number of invited experts" followed by a submission of a report to the Scientific Committee as a whole. 72 According to the 2014 Scientific Committee report, the Government of Japan would underwrite the costs of the specialist workshop to be held in Tokyo, Japan. These comments by the Scientific Committee regarding this Japan-based review process were not endorsed by "scientists from countries that made a statement at plenary that it was inappropriate for the SC (scientific committee) to continue the review of the JARPA II programme" and therefore annexes. 74 In NEWREP-A, the Japanese government took the opportunity to highlight the portions of the ICJ decision that it deemed significant including the conclusion that (1) whales taken under Article VIII are not subject to the IWC Schedule; (2) the object and purpose of the treaty includes "sustainable exploitation"; (3) the Guidelines for research include not just research on whales but also research on "hypotheses not directly related to the management of living marine resources"; (4) the State authorizing special permits has an obligation to offer an "objective basis" for the lethal takes; and (5) lethal sampling "per se"
was "not unreasonable in relation to the research objectives of JARPA II." The NEWREP-A document set out to address the specific inadequacies of the JARPA II program identified by the ICJ with a particular focus on providing a justification for lethal methods and evidence for the size of the lethal sampling set. 75 On the issue of lethal takes, Japan investigated the feasibility of using other methods besides lethal methods including biopsy sampling, satellite tagging, data-logger use, and biomarkers. 76 Japan concludes that these alternatives are not feasible for measuring "age at sexual maturity" which Japan asserts is necessary for setting a maximum sustainable yield ratio and for measuring prey consumption; therefore lethal take methods are necessitated in order to obtain earplugs and dissect of internal organs.
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Regarding lethal sample sizes, Japan indicates in its proposed research plan that the numbers it has picked are largely based on collective "age at sexual maturity" data but that these sizes may need to be revised.
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To address squarely the issue that Japan de facto is participating in commercial whaling through its distribution of special permits under the research proposal, Japan notes that "Japan has therefore announced that it confirmed its basic policy of pursuing the resumption of commercial whaling, and collecting and analyzing necessary data through special permit 74 Proposed Research Plan for New Scientific Whale Research Program in the Antarctic Ocean, available at maff.go.jp/j/whale/pdf/newrep--a.pdf, accessed 10 September 2015. 75 Ibid., at pp. 6-7. The Japanese government also identified other issues raised by the ICJ decision including methodology for selecting whales that would be taken, the open-ended time frame of the scientific programme, the limited scientific output of the programme to date, and the lack of cooperation with other whale research efforts. 76 Ibid., at p. 8. 77 Ibid., at p. 9. 78 Ibid.
whaling for this purpose, in full accordance with legal requirements including the ICRW, its paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule which establishes the moratorium on commercial whaling, as well as in light of the ICJ Judgment." 79 Japan is unequivocal that results from NEWREP-A's are intended to end the twenty-year moratorium. 80 With Japan's intention to issue special permits as an initial step towards resuming whaling, Japan identifies NEWREP-A as offering "an objective basis" for justifying lethal research under Article VIII. 81 In keeping with its conciliatory stance on following institutional process, the document further indicated that Japan is amenable to feedback from other States and institutions about the proposal. 82 Japan specifically indicated that "After the IWC SC will 'review and comment' on this proposed plan, those comments will be given due regard and the proposed plan will be revised, if necessary, taking account of them." conservation. 84 The panel further recommended that a series of panel recommendation many of which included collecting additional information over the course of 1-3 field seasons "should be completed and the results evaluated before there is a final conclusion on lethal techniques and sample sizes." 85 Additional questions were raised by scientists observing the expert panel. 86 There were dissenting voices among scientists observing the panel. 87 Japan 79 Ibid., at p. 11. 80 The moratorium was adopted in 1982 but applied to the 1985/1986 season. 81 NEWREP-A (n. 74), at p. 7. 82 Ibid. ("Japan always welcomes comments from outside that are based upon scientific consideration to which it will give due regard.") 83 Ibid., at 11. 84 Report of the expert panel to review the proposal by Japan for NEWREP-A, 7-10 February, 2015, Tokyo, Japan, SC/66a/Rep6 (2015): 2 ("In summary, with the information presented in the proposal, the Panel noted that it was not able to determine whether lethal sampling is necessary to achieve the two major objectives; therefore, it concluded that the current proposal did not demonstrate the need for lethal sampling to achieve those objectives.") 85 Ibid. submitted some additional data.
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But in June 2015, the IWC Scientific Committee indicated based on the Expert Panel report that it still did not have adequate information to determine whether lethal sampling was necessary. 89 They requested Japan to reply to the Panel's recommendations and progress would be reviewed in 2016. 90 The Scientific Committee did endorse the deployment by Japan of vessels for biopsy sampling and satellite tagging of whales. 91 The report and the scientific committee meeting itself continued to reflect the fissure lines within the IWC that seem to be becoming increasingly more entrenched. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid., at p. 52. 92 Ibid., at 93. "After initial general discussion of this item, a number of comments both supporting NEWREP-A and opposing it were made, some addressing particular issues and others offering broad comments on the general merits or otherwise of the lethal aspects of the proposal, ecosystem management, interpretations of the Resolution from a procedural perspective, a letter19 from a group of 500 scientists from 30 countries opposing the proposal and various comments on the judgment of the International Court of Justice. From this discussion, it was clear that it would not be possible to develop a consensus Committee view of NEWREP-A." 93 Whale Hunt to be Resumed this Year, The Japan Times (June 23, 2015) (Citing Joji Morishita, Japan's representative to the IWC, who claims that pro-preservation states are engaging in "environmental imperialism" and regretting that "There is no definite conclusion in the report itself . . . which is not so surprising in the IWC, because as we know very well the IWC is a divided organization.") ventures. 94 In spite of some changes with the introduction of new review procedures that the Committee is trying to implement, 95 the status quo does not appear to have shifted much from how scientific whaling permits have been previously reviewed under JARPA II. 96 The only existing obligation associated with Article VIII is for a Contracting Government to provide the IWC with "proposed scientific permits before they are issued in sufficient time to allow the Scientific Committee to review and comment on them." 97 There is nothing specific in either Article VIII or in the Schedule to prevent a State from ultimately issuing a special permit that the Scientific Committee may have reservations over as long as the Committee has been given adequate opportunity to "review and comment". This gap between procedure and substance has proven problematic in the review of NEWREP-A. Japan seems to be taking the position that the Scientific Committee has had its opportunity to review and comment on the permit and that there is no obligation for Japan to submit any additional data since as the IWC's webpage states "the IWC does not regulate special permit whaling." Even though it may take time to achieve this substantial revision to both the treaty and its schedule due to political concerns over ceding sovereign interests to international institutions, these amendments are politically possible. based on shared data that is deemed to be highly reliable data.
These amendment proposals are practical from an institutional perspective and should be regarded by States as achieving "good faith" implementation of the object and purpose of the ICRW that was negotiated "to provide for the conservation, development, and optimum utilization of the whale resources." 105 The purpose of the scientific research permit available under Article VIII is to allow ICRW Parties to collectively consider information about whale stocks so that the Parties will collectively make rational management decisions regarding future harvest allowances for different species in different locations. This is why individual
States have an affirmative obligation to "transmit to such body as may be designated by the administrative process might improve the transparency and accountability currently associated with whaling research permits. This shift in the issuance of permits from national offices to international organizations may avoid the recurring diplomatic disputes that States such as Japan are engaging in commercial whaling under the guise of a scientific permit.
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In order to prevent politics from undermining decision-making on the basis of scientific findings by the Scientific Committee, States may also agree to articulate in any amendment a legal standard whereby a scientific permit issued by the Committee will be deemed to be valid unless the Commission can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Scientific Committee is exercising its authority arbitrarily and capriciously.
While this proposed reform may depoliticize some aspects of Article VIII permits and provide a better framework for determining whether a given scientific program has been reasonably designed and implemented as mandated by the ICJ, it will not be enough to simply reform the practices associated with the issuance of special permits to close the existing faultlines between pro-whaling industry and pro-preservation States. As distasteful as it may be for pro-preservation States, the ICRW is a treaty "for the conservation, development, and optimum utilization of the whale resources." While there may be different ideas about what constitutes "optimum utilization of the whale resources" particularly in light of ecosystem service discussions over protecting complex marine food chains and top predators, the ICRW was negotiated in 1946 to support the "orderly development of the whaling industry." Because it is not a preservation treaty per se but reflects instead an early effort at sustainable development, the IWC must revisit the stalled Revised Management Schemes to determine how some level of commercial whaling might be resumed that would also address national food security concerns. moratorium will be lifted rather than whether the moratorium will be lifted, then propreservation States may need to endorse an approach that does not rely on a zero sum strategy but perhaps focuses instead on protecting certain key breeding or feeding areas.
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Whaling in the Antarctic puts in sharp relief the conflicts between State parties over the current operation and the future capacity of the ICRW treaty regime to address whales and whaling. While States may not be able to quickly reconcile their divergent interests, something will need to change institutionally at the Commission for the ICRW to be an effective conservation and sustainable development treaty for the 21 st century. A key focus for
States should be on empowering the Committee to substantively inform decision-making to support the objectives of the ICRW. Otherwise, States can find better uses for their limited resources than propping up a broken treaty regime that neither contributes to long-term conservation of whales nor potential food security.
114 Clapham (n. 30), at p. 241 (Arguing that Japan is likely to pursue a strategy of convincing additional developing countries and small island nations to vote to lift the IWC moratorium and reinstate commercial whaling).
